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In a series of papers Emanuel Schegloff (1987, 1989, 1991, 1992a, b, 1997) has developed 
arguments concerning the coherence of analytic procedures for addressing entities that would 
traditionally have been glossed as ‘social structure’ or ‘social context’.  He argues that ‘social 
context’ should be treated as relevant to analysis only insofar as it features as a participants’ 
concern; that is, only insofar as it is invoked, formulated, oriented to, or displayed in actual 
interaction.  Research conclusions should be disciplined by attending to the procedural 
consequentiality of any claimed contextual particular.   
 
This paper will briefly review Schegloff’s argument and pick out some themes that have been 
highlighted by recent work in discursive psychology (Edwards and Potter, 1992, 1993; 
Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1996).  In particular, it will emphasise the way that cognition, in some 
form or other, is often treated as a taken-for-granted background in discussions of context.  In 
effect, cognition is treated as the inner stuff of perception, storage and inferences and it is set 
over against an outer reality of context, which might be events, settings and social structures.  
However, that reality is typically seen as having its effect via its cognitive perception, 
representations and processing.  The paper will argue that cognition can be subject to some of 
the same analytic moves as context and that, indeed, in participants’ discourse things that 
analysts have traditionally glossed under the categories ‘cognition’ and ‘context’ often blur 
together.   
 
My suggestion is that ‘cognition’ and ‘reality’, conventionally the inner and the outer, can be 
treated in the same way as things which are formulated, attended to, and oriented to in 
discourse.  In this way cognition becomes a topic of discursive study, but is respecified in the 
process.  In the title of a recent paper, Schegloff (1997) asks the rhetorical question Whose 
Context?  This highlights the questionable status of analysts versions of context vis a vis 
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those of participants.  My subtitle –  Whose Cognition? – raises a parallel question with 
respect to cognition. 
 
SCHEGLOFF AND THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CONTEXT 
 
Schegloff’s arguments are directed against a wide range of more or less sophisticated 
treatments of ‘context’ which treat particulars that might conventionally be glossed as 
‘setting’, ‘culture’, or ‘social structure’ as related to interaction insofar as technical analytic 
connections can be made between the two.  The crucial issue is the role of participants’ 
orientations.  Given that there are an indefinite number of possible contextual descriptions 
available for any interaction, how should one particular one be selected as analytically 
germane.  The researcher may have powerful intuitions about the pertinence of gender, say, 
or a courtroom setting; however, that is not the same as showing that these particulars are 
actually relevant.  After all, there are so many potential descriptions that are correct that a 
stronger criterion of relevance is needed.  
 
For example, I am currently working at a desk, a PC, in a room, later than scheduled, in 
response to a request from Karen Tracy, in an Ivory Tower, in the European Union.  All these 
descriptions are in some sense correct – and each might be used to explain some features of 
my activity.  For Schegloff the appropriate analytic discipline is provided by attending to the 
orientations provided by the participants in their interaction and the procedural 
consequentiality of the contextual particular for the interaction. 
 
There is an additional subtlety to Schegloff’s argument.  Even after some contextual 
description has been demonstrated to be procedurally consequential, there is still a further 
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question concerning precisely what element of the context is consequential.  For example, it 
may be that there are particular consequences for the organization of discourse that are 
associated with being interviewed on a television news programme.  However, detailed study 
might reveal that those consequences do not follow in a unique manner from contributing to 
‘media discourse’, but are instead a consequence of more generic interactional contingencies 
(such as the ‘disinterested’ participation status of the interviewer – Schegloff, 1989; Heritage 
and Greatbatch, 1991). 
  
Schegloff’s arguments promote a view of context that is characteristic of  much (but by no 
means all) work in ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, and some strands of discourse 
analysis.  Here ‘context’ is treated as something which is constructed, dealt with and oriented 
to by participants.  Features of participants such as their ethnicity, features of the setting, and 
other ‘ethnographic’ particulars are not treated as separable factors, which can simply be 
related to interaction.   
 
Note that this approach to context starts to dissolve the traditional micro-macro distinction.  
Rather than seeing social structure and context as something prior to, and set over against 
interaction, a range of conversation analytic work has studied the constitution of social 
structural phenomena in talk and texts (Heritage, 1997).  Indeed, this follows from the 
general ethnomethodological emphasis on the reflexivity of interaction that regards 
interaction as pervasively and inescapably context sensitive and context shaping (Heritage, 
1984; Wieder, 1974).  At the same time, work in a more discourse analytic tradition has 
studied the construction of social structural notions (versions of society and social process) in 
talk and texts and how these constructions service a range of interactional and ultimately 
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ideological tasks such as presenting inequalities as necessary, natural or acceptable (Billig, 
1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992).   
 
Note also that this approach does not imply that analysis is being done without ethnographic 
knowledge as if everything relevant is to be discovered in the talk or text.  For one thing, 
knowledge of a language, which itself is a tremendously rich reservoir of ethnographic 
understanding, is a prerequisite for any analysis of conversation or discourse.  Without it we 
would be hard pressed to make much sense of self-repair or the management of stake 
inoculation.  However, that does not mean that the analyst’s intuition about language or 
culture takes priority; rather, analysts’ expectations are disciplined by the materials that are 
being studied.  This is one of the things that distinguishes conversation and discourse analysis 
from conceptual analysis (Edwards, 1997; but see Coulter, 1983). 
 
Note further that this approach blurs the distinction between participants’ and analysts’ 
knowledge.  Instead, there is an emphasis on the symmetry between participants and analysts.  
Rather than social context being something that has its effect behind the participants’ backs in 
a way that only the technical skills of analysts can discern, social context is seen as a problem 
for participants and analysts alike.  For the participants it is a practical problem of how to act: 
has the lesson started? was that an accusation?, and so on; for the analysts the problem is one 
of using what is displayed in the participants’ interaction as a central resource for developing 
more technical understandings (Drew, 1995a).  This is rather different from the kinds of 
sociolinguistics and discourse studies that Schegloff is criticising in which the analyst’s 
technical knowledge about culture or society is taken to provide an essential resource in the 
analysis of talk and texts.  This is not to claim that discourse and conversation analysis is 
merely a reformulation of participants’ knowledge; rather, it is to emphasise the 
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systematically emic nature of such work as it attends to the sense that interaction has for the 
participants. 
 
COGNITION AS CONTEXT 
 
One of the things that is notable for its absence in most discussions of context is explicit 
discussion of the role of cognition.  In their useful overview Charles Goodwin and 
Alessandro Duranti start with Elinor Ochs’ notion that context is ‘the social and 
psychological world in which the language user operates at any given time’ (1992, p.6) and 
they draw on Ochs’ listing of potential contextual attributes: setting, behavioural 
environment, language, and extrasituational context.  This discussion of context works 
against a backdrop of implicit psychological processes.  Contextual particulars such as setting 
or behavioural environment are important because they are perceived, experienced, attended 
to, understood and so on.  Indeed, Goodwin and Duranti divide context into that which is 
focal, thereby treating it as strongly perceptual, and that which is extrasituational and 
therefore depends on either background knowledge or memory (of organizations, history, 
cultural norms and so on). 
 
Much of the discussion of context trades on an implicit cognition/reality distinction.  In this 
implicit view there is a reality of context.  This reality is made up of things and events in the 
world, of history, culture, the institutional setting, bodily orientations, prior conversational 
turns, and so on.  These are all the things that makes context appear to be such a huge and 
intractable issue in traditional formulations of the context problem (Cook, 1990).  This reality 
is assumed, again often implicitly, to have its effect through psychological processes.  That is, 
it is perceived in real time, and brought into settings via knowledge and memory.  This 
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distinction is a messy one.  Both reality and cognition have been constructed in a wide variety 
of ways, in different conceptual and theoretical systems.  Nevertheless, I hope that others will 
recognise the widespread use of this distinction, and the close dependence of context and 
cognition in analytic discourse. 
 
In much sociolinguistic work this cognitivism remains undeveloped and inexplicit.  
Occasionally a cognitive approach is more systematized and related to the technical literature 
of cognitive psychology and cognitive science.  Teun van Dijk’s work provides an ambitious 
example of this approach to context: 
 
contexts are (socially based) mental constructs, or models in memory.  Since meaning 
and other discourse properties are also mentally managed, this also explains the vital 
link between discourse and context: as subjective representations, mental models of 
contexts may thus directly monitor the production and comprehension of talk and text.  
Indeed, without such subjectivity of language users and their minds, the ‘same’ social 
contexts would have the same effect on all language users in the same situation, 
which they obviously have not.  …contexts… need a cognitive definition in order 
to… explain how social structures can influence discourse structures ‘via’ the mind of 
social members (1997, p. 16, emphasis in original). 
 
Or, more pithily, but equally cognitively, Dan Sperber and Dierdre Wilson claim: 
 
the set of premises used in interpreting an utterance... constitutes what is generally 
known as the context.  A context is a psychological construct, a subset of the hearer's 
assumptions about the world (1986, p. 15, emphasis added). 
8 
 
 
My general point, then, is that discussions of context typically presuppose some kind of 
cognitive realm, but this is rarely articulated in an explicit and technical manner.  Across 
social theory, sociolinguistics, critical discourse analysis and discourse studies, a whole 
thesaurus of cognitive notions appear, from the more everyday – knowledge, belief, view, 
goal and plan – to the more technical – short term memory buffers, social representations, 
script processing, category salience and accessibility heuristics.  Indeed, the notions of both 
‘context’ and ‘cognition’ are used to collect together an extraordinarily heterogeneous set of 
processes and entities. 
 
Schegloff’s argument focuses on the management of contextual particulars such as settings, 
but does not address itself to the role of cognition.  For the rest of this paper I will attempt to 
show how the use of cognition in conversation and discourse work can be susceptible to 
similar arguments derived from discursive psychology.  My argument will have two parts.  
First, I will suggest that, when dealing with participants’ discourse, cognitive notions present 
the same analytic trouble, and the same analytic temptations, as the conventional building 
blocks of context: institutional and physical setting, cultural traditions, and so on.  Second, I 
will suggest that they thereby become susceptible to the type of argument that Schegloff has 
directed at (other features of) context. 
 
DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGY — COGNITION AND REALITY  
 
While social structure and its conceptualization has been a major point of discussion in recent 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (Boden & Zimmerman, 1991; Drew & 
Heritage, 1992; Watson & Seiler, 1992), cognition has figured much less significantly.  There 
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has been explicit discussion in Wittgenstein influenced ethnomethodology of cognitive 
notions and forms of analysis (Coulter, 1990, 1991; Lynch and Bogen, 1996) as well as 
arguments against cognitivist interpretations of conversational practices (Heritage, 1990/1); 
however, conversation analysts have often been agnostic with respect to cognitive issues or 
even willing to consider some integration of cognitive and conversational approaches (Drew, 
1995a, b; Mandelbaum & Pomerantz, 1990; Pomerantz, 1990/1). 
 
Perhaps because of their different disciplinary context (!) a number of social psychologists 
with an interest in discourse and rhetoric have problematized the role of cognition in social 
explanation (Antaki, 1994, forthcoming; Billig, 1987; Edwards, 1994, 1997, forthcoming; 
Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, forthcoming; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Widdicombe & 
Wooffitt, 1995).  That is, rather than treating cognition as prior to, and separable from, 
interaction, it is treated as something that is built in, managed in, and constituted in 
interaction.  
 
This has direct implication for discussion of context.  For if settings are assumed to have their 
operation through participants’ representations, and if extrasituational particulars have their 
operation through participants’ knowledge and memories, then discursive psychological work 
which shows up the locally occasioned nature of ‘representation’ and ‘memory’ raises major 
problems.  They make problematic the very technical scaffolding that is required to track the 
effects of traditional contextual notions.  My argumentative strategy here will be to show how 
both the ‘outer’ world of reality, and the ‘inner’ world of cognition, enter into analysis 
through orientations and constructions.  Moreover, in participants discourse constructions of 
the world and cognition are often mutually implicative: cognition (attitude, say, or disinterest) 
can be managed through descriptions while reality (events, say or actions) can be stabilized 
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and managed through a range of cognitive claims and avowals (more descriptions, in this 
case of mental furniture).  Indeed, the notions of cognition and reality only seem so neatly 
separable in the abstract analytic language of social researchers. 
 
Let me clarify and exemplify these ideas by showing how they can be applied to a particular 
case. 
 
MANAGING COGNITION AND REALITY 
 
In the following extract from a phone call, Skip is talking with Leslie, his wife, about a 
burglary that happened at their house on the previous day.  Leslie is providing further 
information about the events to Skip.  The section I will focus on is in lines 13 to 30. 
01. Leslie: .hhhh An’ the man f’m the ↑pub came along  
02.   ‘n said th’t they’d bean done again.h 
03.   (0.2) 
04. Skip:  Oh: 
05.   (.) 
06. Leslie: ((sniff))  
07. Skip:     go:sh I had a look round the:re las’ night 
08.   (can’t) see any sign (but yet 
09.   again maybe) he wz here fi:rst 
10. Leslie:     Ah. 
11.   (0.9) 
12. Leslie: Ye:s, .hhhh Well uh:m (0.9) .tch! (0.6) 
13.   So then the police, hhh ↑then … hhh 
14.   ↑I saw this very shifty looking character 
15.   coming alo:ng, .hhh h an’‘e ↑looked ih (0.2) 
16. Skip:                           (   ) 
17. Leslie: u-↑right in ↓our dining room?h 
18.   (1.0) 
19. Skip:  (      ) 
20. Leslie: An’ a ↑very sorta sidelong cra:fty look. 
21. Skip:  Uh huh? 
22. Leslie: And e- (0.5) ↑Talia also noticed him an’ hhe wz 
23.   carrying a ↑suit↓case you see:, 
24.   (.) 
25. Skip:  Ye:h? 
26.   (0.6) 
27. Leslie: .tch An’ a Bee:jam ba:g. .hhhhh And uh,hhhh! (0.8) 
28.   So I thought ↑well I dunno 
29.   I’ll tell th’police about him 
30.   he caught the bus: which w’d’v got into Yeovil  
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31.   about ten .hhh (0.4) thi:rty an’ it wz then  
32.   about ten o’clock.h  
33. Skip:  Ye:s, 
34. Leslie: .hhhh So ↑I: wandered round t’th↓pub becuz they  
35.   were there then,hh 
36. Skip:  Mmhm? 
37. Leslie: .hhhh ↑An’ they↑ didn’ n↑anything about ou:r  
38.   burglary hhheh heh! 
 
(Holt:X(Christmas)2: Side 1: Call 6 pp. 2-3) 
 
 
In terms of my discussion of widespread assumptions in discourse research, there is the 
reality of persons, events etc. (‘context’) and the inner world of knowledge, motivations and 
mental processes (‘cognition’).  What I want to pick out in particular here is the description 
of the ‘character’ who is reported to the police, and the description of the act of reporting 
itself.  So, put simply, my start point will be some bit of reality (the ‘character’) and some bit 
of cognition (Leslie’s ‘knowledge’).  My suggestion will be that descriptions of both of these 
things are oriented to action; in a sense they formulate context and cognition, but as analysts 
we would be well advised to avoid treating them as separable items that can be correlated 
with action. 
 
Let me start with the idea that these speakers are part of a culture where reporting someone 
who has not committed a crime to the police is potentially a delicate matter.  It may make you 
vulnerable to be treated as a snitch, a busybody, or even as paranoid.  That is, this is an 
activity where the actor’s motivation is particularly vulnerable to question.  If this were the 
case, we might expect to see evidence of this in the way the activity is reported.  Here I 
suggest we can see this evidence in the description of the character and of the speaker’s 
cognitive processes prior to the reporting.   
 
A first description is offered in line 14; the person is a ‘very shifty looking character’.  The 
word shifty does a lot of work here (‘given to evasions’, ‘furtive in character’ appear in the 
12 
 
Collins dictionary).  It is a description that delivers dishonesty with it.  But note that ‘shifty 
looking’ does not go beyond the evidence given; it displays that the speaker has not jumped 
to the conclusion that the person is, necessarily, actually shifty.  
 
In lines 14, 17 and 20 contain descriptions of actions.  The initial description ‘looked in’ is 
upgraded to ‘right in’ the dining room.  And the description of the look is further upgraded as 
‘very sorta sidelong crafty’.  In lines 22-3 and 27 a further descriptive particular is provided.  
The person was carrying a ‘suitcase’ and a ‘Bejam bag’ (Bejam is a supermarket chain). 
 
What is particularly interesting here is the way these external descriptions suggest 
motivations on the part of the person.  As well as looking ‘shifty’, the ‘sidelong’ into the 
dining room in a ‘crafty’ way suggests planning and surreptitious intentions.  This fits with 
the suitcase and supermarket bag.  A potential thief is likely to need something to carry their 
stolen goods in.  The observation of there being two different kinds of bag is particularly 
neat.  Someone with a supermarket bag is likely to have done their shopping; someone with a 
suitcase may be travelling.  Both types of bag together are not tied to a conventional category 
in this way.  But they are certainly consistent with a criminal who may be improvising ways 
of carrying goods.  These methods for producing inferences via descriptions and categories 
were, of course, been a major topic of Harvey Sack’s early lectures (Sacks, 1992) and the 
work on membership categories that done since (e.g. Hester & Eglin, 1997; Jayyusi, 1984).  
 
Descriptions of this kind, then, do not allow for easy distinctions between the outer world and 
people’s inner life, between cognition and reality.  These ‘external’ descriptions suggest, 
more or less directly, a range of ‘inner’ or cognitive processes. 
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So far I have concentrated on the nature of the descriptions in a rather abstract way.  
However, their sequential unfolding is relevant to my suggested analysis.  Skip takes a 
number of brief turns during the description of the ‘shifty character’ (lines 16, 19, 21, 25).  
However, it is notable that he does not provide news receipts, second assessments or displays 
of affiliation.  The only audible responses he makes are the neutral continuers on lines 21 and 
25 (Schegloff, 1982).  For example, Leslie’s strongly upgraded ‘very sorta sidelong crafty 
look’ on line 20 comes after her previous description of the suspicious look had been 
responded to only by a one second pause and an inaudible response from Skip.  He does not 
provide a vigorous news receipt and or assessment or affiliation; nothing like the potential: 
‘oh god, so d’ya think that was our burglar’.  So it is what Skip does not do that may occasion 
Leslie’s upgraded description in line 20.  Then note that Skip’s response to the upgraded 
description in line 20 is ‘uh huh?’.  That is, he is still not providing a strong display of 
affiliation.  And it is here, on line 20, that Leslie starts to give the suitcase description (‘and 
e-‘), but breaks off to offer the corroborating description ‘Talia also noticed him’.   
 
Note that after the suitcase description is delivered on line 23 Leslie says ‘you see’, which 
may be an attempt to establish shared knowledge (Edwards, 1997) or elicit an upshot.  But 
again Skip comes back with a non-committal continuer (‘yeh’, line 25).  It is after this that 
Leslie provides the suitcase and bag description.  At the conclusion of this she does a long 
inbreath, the ‘and uh’, which possibly displays a failed search for something more to add, and 
then a long outbreath.  All this is followed by a pause that is not filled by Skip.  So again 
there is no second assessment, affiliation, or recognition of the upshot of the description.  
This is the environment in which Leslie delivers her description of informing the police. 
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I started the discussion of this extract with the idea that in this culture it can be a delicate 
matter to report someone who has not committed a crime to the police.  Part of this delicacy 
is displayed in the way the description of the putative thief is built in lines 14-27.  The 
delicacy is also displayed in the way the reporting is described, and in particular the prefacing 
of this action in line 28.  The upshot of the observation of the suspicious character is not ‘so I 
told the police about him’.  It is: 
Leslie: So I thought ↑well I dunno 
  I’ll tell th’police about him 
That is, despite the rather elaborate working up of reasons to be suspicious of this person, 
they represent their action as equivocal (note the ‘well’ dispreference marker) and as based 
on uncertain or insufficient knowledge.   
 
Wayne Beach (1997) has identified some interactional uses of ‘claims to insufficient 
knowledge’ such as ‘I don’t know’.  He shows some uses where participants can display 
uncertainly or neutrality, or can head off actions.  In this case it is used in the report of an 
action that has already being performed.  As a display of uncertainty I suggest that one of the 
things that ‘well, I dunno’ can do is soften the link that may potentially be heard lying 
between the action (informing the police) and noxious motivations that might arise from 
categories such as snitch, busybody or paranoid.   
 
Some of its detailed characteristics may contribute to this.  Note that it is ‘I dunno’ rather 
than the full ‘I don’t know’.  Without systematically examining a range of similar and 
contrasting examples it is no more than a suggestion; however, my sense from preliminary 
study is that ‘I dunno’ is a distinct phrase rather than an alternative pronunciation of ‘I don’t 
know’ (see Potter, 1996, 1997 for further discussion of ‘I dunno’).  Note that it is 
commonplace to hear people say ‘she doesn’t know’, but ‘she dunno’ sounds odd to me.  
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Perhaps the running together of the words in this way is a display of casualness of thought, 
and this can be done sensibly about oneself but not about someone else.  Whether this is right 
or not, the phrase can certainly soften a link between actions and motivations by tying the 
action to equivocation about relevant knowledge rather than having it arise directly from 
potentially problematic motivation (elsewhere I have written about this in terms of ‘stake 
inoculation’ – Potter, 1996).  The point is not that some notion of knowledge is not relevant 
to the analysis, it is that knowledge and its insufficiency is being constructed for the action at 
hand and any discourse analysis needs to attend to this constructed and action oriented nature. 
 
CONCLUSION – COGNITION AS CONTEXT 
 
The point of this discussion has been to highlight the importance of treating cognition in 
much the same way as (other features of) context; as something that is formulated, worked 
up, constituted and oriented to by participants.  Indeed, when dealing with actual materials it 
becomes hard to sustain any hard and fast analytic distinction between cognition and 
contextual reality; instead there are complex patterns of mutual implications.  Describing 
someone as ‘crafty’ and carrying bags provides for a particular motivation account.  
Prefacing a reported action with ‘I thought well I dunno’ can head off available inferences 
about motivations that might be tied to that action.  Cognition and reality blur together as talk 
unfolds; neither stand as a separable contextual frame against which to explain talk.   
 
Cognition, reality and context are analysts’ categories with their own history and tropology.  
It may be that the sorts of ontology they imply, and boundary work they perform, has been 
more constraining than helpful to social research.  There is no reason why distinctions 
between them should necessarily be consequential for participants.  Rather than legislating as 
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to their implications prior to analysis, one of the themes in discursive psychology is precisely 
to study the varied contextual practices involving (what psychologists and other social 
sciences have treated as unproblematically) cognitive notions (Edwards, 1997).  This does not 
involve a commitment to there being some unified, coherent and homogenous field of 
cognition. 
 
This leaves a significant question with respect to the status of my own account.  Is my 
account cognitive?  After all, I have talked about motivation, stake, participants’ orientations 
and so on.  Is my account a strategic account of what is going on, which relies on some 
notion of Leslie ‘thinking out’ how to deal with a delicate task?  Beach and Metzger (1997) 
write of the strategic deployment of ‘I don’t knows’.  I would suggest that my analytic story 
of what is going on between Leslie and Skip is cognitive in the limited sense that it treats 
action in intentional terms, rather than brute movements or causal processes.  And our 
language for talking about action is imbued with cognitivist connotations.  To talk of Leslie’s 
talk as managing the attribution of noxious motives seems to imply a strategic planner lying 
behind everything.  However, I suggest that using this language to explicate action need not 
commit the analyst to cognitivism.  That is, it need not commit the analyst to explaining what 
is going on terms of cognitive processes or events in the heads of actors.   
 
In this case, for example, I would not expect that Leslie’s ‘thought’, or lack of firm 
knowledge, of the putative thief’s criminal intentions, are mental entities that could be 
identified through some more technical psychological machinery (a questionnaire, a depth 
interview, protocol elicitation, a CAT scan).  As to whether Leslie is strategically managing 
motive attribution or not, I am certainly not committed to some notion of Leslie consciously 
planning how to deal with this encounter.  On the one hand, this seems rather unlikely for a 
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casual telephone call (but see Heritage, 1990/1; Hopper, 1997).  On the other, plans and goals 
start to become more insubstantial as cognitive objects when they come under close scrutiny 
(Edwards, 1997; Heritage, 1990/1; Suchman, 1997).  To some researchers this may seem like 
an uncomfortable fudge; however, in my view is allows research to be conducted without the 
various confusions that I have tried to show follow from cognitivist approaches to discourse. 
 
The general point, then, is that the notion of context as a mental construction in memory (van 
Dijk, 1997) or a set of hearer’s mental assumptions (Sperber & Wilson, 1986) becomes 
problematic for the kinds of reasons that Schegloff adduces to problematize more 
sociological and sociolinguistic notions of independent context.  In particular, close analysis 
reveals major difficulty in (a) separating cognitive context from ongoing participants 
constructions; (b) deciding what precisely counts as mental.  This does not mean, however, 
that cognition ceases to be interesting.  Just as the ethnomethodological cautions against 
adopting simple notions of determinate institutional contexts have not prevented a thriving 
body of discourse research on institutional talk, so discursive psychological cautions about 
cognitivism are not meant to take discourse researchers away from treating cognition in talk 
and text as a fertile topic for study. 
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